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This is a thesis about Hayek's liberalism. My focus
is placed on examining the meta-theoretical problems
involved in Hayek's justification of liberty. To start
with, I shall argue that Hayek has sought to justify
liberty in terms of the fact-value distinction thesis.
Unresolved difficulties inherent in this justificatory
attempt will be pointed out. My contention is that if
my analysis of them is correct, then the fact-value
distinction thesis can hardly serve as a convincing
basis. It is at this point that my discussion of the
problem of justification will be shifted from the logical
level to the normative level. I shall argue that Hayek's
in
defence of liberty is utilitarianncharacter. I shall
also point out that Hayek has located his utilitarianism
in the evolutionist tradition which holds that the
selection of rules is guided not by rational calculation
but by success. Furthermore, his conception of general
welfare will be explicated. Hayek's evolutionary
utilitarianism, as it stands, calls the role of reason
or human effort in social and political reform into
question. I shall argue that although Hayek rejects
the constructivists' views on reason, this does not
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entail that he rejects reason per se. Rather, he
recommends us a humble conception of rationality. This
will be discussed in terms of his notion of 'immanent
criticism'. Lastly, I shall examine whether immanent
criticism entails relativism.
INTRODUCTION
This is a thesis about Hayek's liberalism. However,
my focus is not primarily focused on examining its
substantive aspects but rather on exploring the theoretical,
or say, meta-theoretical problems involved in his
justification of liberty.
In order to prepare the way for latter discussion,
I shall divide this introduction into two parts. I
shall first introduce some of the central notions that
constitute the core of Hayek's liberalism. I shall then
proceed to highlight the problems that will be discussed
in this thesis.
In The Principles of a Liberal Social Order, Hayek
proclaims that his version of liberalism is based on an
evolutionary interpretation of all phenomena of culture
and on an insight into the limits of the powers of
human reason. (1)
To begin with, Hayek's theory of knowledge is tied
with the empiricist position. In a nutshell, this is
that it is logically impossible to conclusively justify
empirical knowledge.' Since man can only experience
what he has so far experienced, it follows that he cannot
prove that his knowledge of the world is absolutely true.
2If this view is correct, then any position which claims
to have discovered the inexorable law of social development
must be untenable.
On the contrary, Hayek argues that owing to our
limited experience, we can never foretell the future of
social d0elopment. Rather, we have to grapple with
ever new and unforeseeable circumstances and develop
ways of adapting to them.
Over the years, men have developed practices that
bring them success. These practices are transmitted to
later generations through socialization. Like Wittgenstein,
Hayek claims that men learn language and social practices
not by grasping the rules that constitute them. Rather,
we learn all of these by using them. As such, most of
the rules that govern our behavior now are inarticulate
in nature. Though capable of honouring these rules in
action, we may not know them in articulated form. It
is enough that we know how to act in accordance with the
rules without knowing that the rules are such and such
in articulated terms. (2)
For Hayek, these inarticulate rules embodying the
experience of many trials and errors of past generations
are of great value for us to cope successfully with the
world. If we renounce them simply because they cannot
be rationally demonstrated or proven, then we would
destroy many inherited practices that are beneficial to
us. For this reason, Hayek recommends us to maintain an
humble attitude towards traditional practices.
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Furthermore, Hayek holds that we are permanently
ignorant of all the particular facts on which the working
of modern society rests. It is because they are diversified
and dispersed' throughout its members. It goes without
saying that each member of society can have only a
small fraction of the knowledge possessed by all. (3)
If my exposition of Hayek's theory of knowledge above is
correct, then it seems that any attempt to restructure
society in accordance with some detailed plan is bound
to be in vain, since such reconstruction entails that
man is omniscient. This, I think, constitutes one of
the major reasons why Hayek rejects what he calls
'constructivist rationalism' which holds that all
social institutions are, and ought to be, the product of
deliberate design. (4)
Not only does he think that constructivist rational-
ism is logically impossible, he also considers it as
factually erroneous. Hayek argues that not all social
institutions are the product of deliberate design. Rather,
most of them are the result of a long process of social
evolution. In other words, they are the result of
a process of natural selection in which alternative practices or
institutions compete and only those conducive to actual
success can pass muster. The practices of successful
groups will, then, be imitated by many others. This
process of spontaneous imitation gradually renders these
practices prevalent.
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Here we see that these practices are not the result of
human design in the sense that they are not deliberately
adopted. Rather, they are selected by their success
in promoting human flourishment.
Before ending the first part of this introduction,
something should be said about what Hayek means by the
phrase liberal institution. By this he means the
legal framework within which individuals can pursue his
self-chosen ends and activity, consistent with the equal
liberty *for all others. From here we see that liberty,
for Hayek, is not absolute. If individuals are to live
tolerably together, rules of law are needed to protect
them from being arbitrarily coerced by others. In other
words, in order to secure equal liberty for all, actions
that deprive others of having the same opportunity to
choose for his own have to be prohibited by such rules.
This, I think, is why Hayek tells us that the liberal
conception of freedom is necessarily one of freedom
under a law which limited the freedom of each so as to
secure the same freedom of all. (5)
Having explicated some of the main notions of
Hayek's liberalism, I shall now proceed to highlight
the problems that will be discussed in this thesis.
While many works have been written on the substantive
aspects of Hayek's liberalism, not much attention has
been paid to the meta-theoretical problems involved in
his justification of liberty. This thesis is meant to
temedy this situation.
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In Chapter I, I shall contend that Hayek seeks to
justify liberty in terms of the fact-value distinction
thesis. In short, if value-judgements, unlike factual
statements, are incapable of rational justification, then
the state can have no legitimate epistemological ground
to force others to forgo their values and accept those
supposed to be promoted. As such, instead of imposing
values on its citizens, the state should leave them as
free as possible to pursue their self-chosen ends.
However, I shall argue that Hayek's conception of liberty
cannot be defended on meta-ethical ground alone. For
if liberty is so defended, Hayek will commit the naturalistic
fallacy by grounding values on facts.
In Chapter II, I shall turn to discuss Hayek's moral
basis for liberty. I shall argue that his defence of
liberty is made from the utilitarian position. But
a thorny question arises here. Throughout his works, he
gives us the impression that he is an opponent of
utilitarianism. For, according to Hayek, utilitarianism
implies constructivist rationalism. As such, it seems
that any attempt to characterize him as an utilitarian
is futile. However, I shall contend that there is no
necessary or internal connection between these two
positions. If this is correct, then the rejection of
constructivist rationalism does not imply the rejection
of utilitarianism. Hence, Hayek can reject the former,
and still hold to the latter.
Moreover, I shall point out that Hayek's version
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of utilitarianism is tied with the evolutionary theory
of the growth of social institutions. This theory
stresses that the selection of rules of conduct is
guided not by rational calculation but by success.
Lastly, I shall explicate Hayek's conception of.
utility*in terms of his criterion of general welfare.
Hayek tells us that his conception of general welfare
consists in the maximization of the chances of anyone
selected at random. However, what is meant by this
has not been articulated clearly enough by him. I shall
attempt to clarify this by offering my own interpretation.
In Chapter III, I shall examine whether Hayek's
evolutionism necessitates the elimination of the role
of reason in bringing about social reform.
I shall argue that although Hayek repudiates the
constructivists' views on reason, this does not entail
that he repudiates reason per se. Rather, far from
abandoning reason, he pleads that an effective use of
reason required a'proper insight into the limits of the
effective use of individual reason. For Hayek, these
limits lie in certain facts of human situation: the
historical situatedness of human existence, the incurable
ignorance of man, and the evolutionary growth of the
content of traditions.
I shall, then, turn to examine Hayek's argument that
if we are doomed to be confined by these three limits,
we must be content with immanent criticism. According to
Hayek, the evolutionary thesis and the ignorance thesis
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join together to dismantle any attempt to ground moral
standards conclusively. An important question
immediately arises. If we fall short of an absolute
foundation, how can we proceed to make criticism? In
my opinion, Hayek is facing a dilemma here. He has to
seek a basis which is not absolute in nature, but
which at the same time is not arbitrary in character.
I shall, from the Hayekean point of view, suggest a
solution to resolve this dilemma.
Some critics point out that Hayek's endorsement of
immanent criticism commits him to some form of relativism.
For the former entails that if there are two or more
contextual standards, there is no independent way of
deciding which one of them is better than another. In
response to this charge, one may argue on behalf of
Hayek that he is not a relativist in that he does
propose an objective criterion for the appraisal of
competing traditional contexts. The criterion referred
to here is his conception of general welfare. However,
I shall point out that this response is fraught with
difficulties. If he fails to resolve them, then I think
Hayek can be rightly criticized for offering us only a
foundationless liberalism. This is one of the main
conclusions of this thesis.
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Chapter I
Fact-Value Distinction and Liberty
The objectives of this chapter are two-fold, first,
to argue that Hayek has sought to justify liberty in
terms of the fact-value distinction thesis and second,
to evaluate whether Hayek is successful in supporting
the value of liberty on this meta-ethical ground.
To establish a general background for the discuss-
ion below, I shall begin by making a sketch of the
fact-value distinction thesis. I shall then proceed
to demonstrate how Hayek makes use of this thesis to
defend liberty. Finally, I shall point out some unre-
solved difficulties inherent in this justificatory at-
tempt. It is my contention that if my analysis of these
unresolved difficulties below is correct, then the
fact-value distinction thesis can hardly serve as a
convincing basis for liberty.
It is one and the same. thing to say that one thing
is distinct from another and that they are different
in kind. As such, the fact-value distinction thesis
implies that there is a fundamental difference between
.facts and values, or, say, factual statements and value-judge-
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ments. But precisely what sorts of statements count
as factual statements as opposed to value-judgements?
In what follows, I shall confine myself to the positi-
vists' reply to this question.
For positivists, to make a factual statement is
to state.what a fact is. And facts which are the ob-
jective referent of the statement exist independently
of any words or interpretations we attach to them.
This is to say that the factual statements state facts
whose existence does not presuppose any institution of
language or categorical framework. These facts are,
so to speak, ontologically independent brute data-
data whose validity cannot be questioned by offering
another interpretation or reading, data whose credibi-
lity cannot be confounded or undermined by further
reasoning. '(1) For..this reason, factual statements which
report these data are capable of empirical verification
and falsification. Or more precisely, the truth or
falsity of such statements can be objectively establish-
ed by showing whether they do correspond to brute data.
As such, factual statements are considered to be ob-
jectively justifiable knowledge claims.
In the case of value-judgements, positivists adopt
what in the main can be called the non-cognitivist
position. By non-cognitivism, they mean that value-
judgements are not capable of rational justification,
that is, of being shown to be true or false by means
of empirical test. The reason for this is that unlike
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factual statements, value-judgements are primarily
expressions of the utterer's subjective attitudes or
commitments to act in a certain way. As such, they
cannot be thought of as corresponding to facts. it
follows from this that conflicts between value-
judgements cannot be resolved by reference to
non-evaluative brute data.
For our discussion of the fact-value distinction
issue to be complete, it is not enough just to show
that facts and values are different. As G.J. Warnock
points out, what positivits are contending is not merely
that facts and values are different in kind, but that
they are in an important sense logically independent. (2)
What is meant by this is that it is impossible to
deduce evaluative conclusions from factual premises, an
ought from an is. To deny this is to fail to
comply with the rule of deductive inference. As is
generally maintained, in a valid deductive argument, it
is not possible that there should be something in the
conclusion which is not included in the premises. From
this it follows that no logical relations can hold
between factual statements and evaluative statements,
since the former is not the latter or vise versa. In
fact, this is why R.M. Hare tells us in The Language
of Morals that no imperative conclusion can be validly
drawn from a set of premises which does not contain
at least one imperative. (3) So, although Hare, like
the positivists, admits that value-judgements are not
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amenable to empirical verification and falsification,
he does hold that they can be properly justified by sub-
sumption under some value premises. To be sure, particular
value-judgements can be justified by reference.to more
basic ones. However, this process of appealing-must
eventually reach some fundamental value-judgements which
cannot be justified any further. Hare, among many others,
argues that at this point that whether these most basic
principles are to be accepted is entirely up to the eva-
luator's decision. The implication is that evaluation
is, in the final analysis, a matter of personal choice.
As such, no rational justification, be it logical or
empirical, can be provided when there are disagreements
on fundamental values or life attitudes. Individuals,
as Max Weber emphatically points out, have to choose
their own Gods and Demons. He writes:
What man will take upon himself the attempt to
refute scientifically the ethic of the Sermon on
the Mount? For instance, the sentence, resist no
evil,.or the image of turning the other cheek?
And yet it is clear, in mundane perspective, that
this is an ethic of undignified conduct one has
to choose between the religious dignity which this
ethic confers and the dignity of manly conduct
preaches something quite different resist evil-
lest you be co-responsible for an overpowering evil.
According to our ultimate standpoint, the one is
the Devil and the other the God, and the individual
has to decide which is God for him and.which is
the Devil. And so it goes throughout all the
orders of life. (4)
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But how does all this come back to our concern with Hay-
yek's justification of liberty? In what follows I
shall concentrate on demonstrating that Hayek's case
for liberty is based upon the fact-value distinction
thesis.
In Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol.2 and his
earlier works, Hayek is very critical of the imposition
of a merit-based pattern of distribution by the state.
The upshot of his argument is as follows. Since judge-
ments on moral merits are utterly subjective in charac-
ter, no general agreement on them can be objectively
established when individuals hold different criteria
and enter into a dispute. So, if the state insists on
implementing a merit-based pattern of distribution, one
of a variety of differing criteria of moral merit has
to be arbitrarily picked out and imposed on others.
Hence, this pattern of distribution is regarded by Ha-
yek as imcompatible with liberty because it requires
that all men are made to serve a hierarchy of values.
(5)
Consider the following illustration. For example,
John says Mary deserves to be rewarded. In saying
this John is making a particular evaluative judgement.
As has been stressed above, to justify his evaluation,
John cannot deduce it from the factual statement, say,
that. Mary performs an action which has the feature x,
unless he is already committed to the moral principle
:hat whoever performs an action which has the feature x
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deserves to be rewarded. In other words, John cannot
move from the specification of an action to an eva-
luation of it without introducing a prescriptive major
premise relating the action and the evaluation. (6) So,
John must first accept the feature x as a criterion of
merit, s-o as to move logically from* Mary, performs an
action which has the feature x to Mary deserves to be
rewarded. And this acceptance is, in turn, based on
his personal preference. Now, suppose another person,
say Paul, disagrees with John by holding that whoever
performs an action which has the feature y deserves to
be rewarded, which criterion should we choose, John's
or Paul's? Can we objectively determine which is more
preferable? Can we possibly resolve the disagreement be-
tween them? Hayek's answer to these questions is ne-
gative and can be founded in the following passage:
The *merit of an action is in its nature something
subjective and rests in a large measure on circum-
stances which only the acting person can know and
the importance of which different people will
assess very differently. Does it constitute great-
er merit to overcome personal loathing or pain,
physical weakness or illness? Does it constitute
greater merit to have risked one's life or to have
damaged one's reputation? Individually each of us
may have very definite answers to such questions,
but there is little probability that we shall all
agree and evidently no prove to others that our
.opinion is right. This means, however, that an
attempt to renumerate man according to their sub-
jective merit it must always be the opinion of a
few which must :be imposed upon' the rest. (7)
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By now it should be clear that the reason which Ha-
yek has for maintaining that general agreement on quest-
ions of moral merit is hardly attainable is his accept-
ance of the fact-value distinction thesis. Expressing
the subjective attitudes of the valuers, conflicting
judgements on what constitutes the merit of an action
are not capable of rational resolution. That is, no one
is capable of logically or empirically justifying the
claim'that one criterion is more preferable to another.
If that is the case, then the state, without exception,
can have no legitimate epistemological ground to force
others to forgo their own values and accepted those
supposed to be promoted. It goes without saying that
if the state is to implement a merit-based pattern of
distribution, it has to prefer one to another in an ar-
bitrary manner. This means that by so doing the state
would create a situation where some were coerced by the
values of others. Hence, Hayek argues that if questions
of values in general are beyond the pale of rational
justification, then the state should be neutral with
respect to them and leave the individuals alone to pur-
sue their self-chosen values without arbitrary inter-
ference. From here we can clearly see that the fact-
value distinction thesis does play a justificatory role
in Hayek's defence of liberty. In The Moral Element
in Free Enterprise Hayek asserts:
It would be impossible to assert that a free
society will always necessarily develop values
which we would approve, or even that it will main-
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tain values which are compatible with the preser-
vation of freedom. All that we can say that the
values we hold are the product of freedom..., and
that it is to thee-desir-e to be able to follow one's
own moral convictions that we owe the modern safe-
guards of freedom. (8)
However, can the fact-value distinction thesis by it-
self provide a justifying reason for the evaluative
judgement that individuals should be left alone to pur-
sue their self-chosen values? I shall contend that it
cannot. My argument is that Hayek himself has failed
to recognize the logical gulf between facts and values,
when he uses the fact-value distinction thesis to justi-
fy his recommendation for liberty. It is to the analy-
sis of this problem that I now turn.
To evaluate whether the fact-value distinction
thesis can by itself provide a justifying reason for
the evaluative judgement that individuals should be left
-alone to pursue their self-chosen values is to assess the
validity of deriving the latter from the former. As men-
tioned above, in a valid moral argument, no imperative
conclusion can be deduced from a set of premises which
does not contain at least one imperative. Thus, in order
to assess the validity of Hayek's derivation of his re-
commendation from the fact-value distinction thesis, we
have to determine, first and foremost, whether the said
thesis contains any moral imperative. To do this, of
course, requires some understanding of what sort of
statement the fact-value distinction thesis is to be
counted.
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As has been pointed out above, the fact-value dis-
tinction thesis involves maintaining that facts and
values are different in terms of their ontological and
cognitive status, and that there is a logical gap between
factual statements and value-judgements. As such/ the
fact-value distinction thesis is not concerned with
passing first-order normative judgements suchas 'The
state should be neutral to the question of good life.'
or 'Individuals should be left alone to pursue their
self-chosen values.' Rather, it is concerned with
answering general epistemological and logical questions
about normative judgements. These questions are commonly
regarded by moral philosophers as meta-ethical questions
such as 'Are value-judgements, like factual statements,
capable of rational justification?' or 'Can value-judge-
ments be logically deduced from factual statements alone?'
Now, if the fact-value distinction thesis is not itself
a first order evaluative judgement but a second-order
meta-ethical statement which is value-neutral in content,
I wonder how it can serve as the premise for any moral
or imperative conclusion. To recapitulate, no imperative
conclusion can be validly deduced from a set of premises
which does not contain at least one imperative. Hence,
it is justifiable to say that Hayek's attempt to derive
the evaluative judgement that individuals should be left
alone to pursue their self-chosen values is invalid. If
my analysis above is correct, then I think Hayek himself
has failed to recognize the gulf between facts and values,
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meta-ethical statements and evaluative judgemnets when
he seeks to justify liberty in terms of the fact-value
distinction thesis.
To-conclude this chapter, I shall point out another
unresolved difficulty related to the use of the fact-
value distinction thesis for the justification of liberty.
This is the tension between the claim that questions of
values are beyond the pale of justification and, the
need for providing a reasoned defence for the value of
liberty.
The interesting question related to this is
how it is possible for Hayek to justify the claim that
liberty is morally prior to other values, in view of
the fact that he has endorsed the view that no rational
justification, be it logical or empirical, can be provided
when there are disagreements on fundamental values.
What I am saying here is that if we accept, as Hayek
does, the view that all values are not capable of rational
justification, then we are committed to holding that the
evaluative judgement that liberty is morally prior to
other values cannot be justified as well. If I am right
in this point, then I cannot see how Hayek can con-
sistently justify liberty on the ground that all values
are beyond the pale of justification.
I hope my analysis of the logical problems involved
in Hayek's justification of liberty in terms of the fact-
value distinction thesis has clearly shown that his re-
commendation for liberty cannot be defended on meta-
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ethical ground alone. This analysis leaves us with a
question: what can be the moral basis of the principle
of liberty that Hayek invokes? This question is con-
cerned with the transition from the logical to the
substantive level in the problem of justification. In
the next Chapter, I shall argue that Hayek has sought to
justify liberty in utilitarian terms.
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Chapter II
Hayek And Utilitarianism
Like other liberal thinkers before or after him,
Hayek does proclaim in all his works that individuals
should be allowed to use their knowledge for their self-
chosen purposes, restrained only by rules of just con-
duct of universal application. (1) When asked to give
reasons for this claim, Hayek has, in my view, grounded
liberty on its instrumental value towards the promotion
of the general welfare. As such, it seems reasonable
to suggest that his defence of liberty is made from what,
in the main, can be called the utilitarian position.
This is the main theme of this chapter. My analysis is
three-fold in character. In the first place, I shall
consider a rather powerful objection that would be raised
against those (of whom I am one) attempting to regard
Hayek as an utilitarian. Simply put, this is that
Hayek is not an utilitarian because he is an opponent of
constructivist rationalism. I shall then proceed to
show that Hayek has indeed adopted a distinctive form of
utilitarianism, namely evolutionary utilitarianism.
Finally, I shall delineate Hayek's conception of utiliy
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in terms of his criterion of general welfare. Let us
now proceed to the consideration of the said objection.
This objection challenges the legitimacy of our
major premise that Hayek is an utilitarian and*so must
be resolved before we can go any further. The upshot
of this objection is that Hayek repudiates constructivist
rationalism of which utilitarianism is just a particular
form it follows that he must repudiate utilitarianism
as well. It is true that there is one passage that sides
with our objector's position in Law, Legislation and
Liberty,Vol.2.
The consistent utilitarian is therefore driven to
interpret the products of evolution anthropomor-
phically as_ the- product of design-and to pos tDlate
a personified society as the author of these rules
..., such anthropomorphism is characteristic of all
constructivist conception of which utilitarianism
is but a particular form. (2)
None the less, this by itself does not invalidate our
characterization of Hayek as an utilitarian. The reason
for this is that I do not think utilitarianism necessarily
implies constructivist rationalism. As such, the latter
cannot be considered as a necessary component of an
utilitarian position, and therefore refutation of it
cannot be considered as part of the refutation of utili-
tarianism. In what follows, I would center my analysis
on this point.
Let us begin by examining what Hayek means by
constructivist rationalism. In the introduction of
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his Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol.1, Hayek defines
constructivist rationalism as follows: the view that
all institutions are, and ought to be the product of
deliberate design. (3) For him, the failings of this
position are numerous. And I shall concentrate only
upon two aspects that are relevant to the point at issue
here. The first is concerned with the origin of social
institutions. For constructivists, according to, Hayek,
social institutions are designed or built for the
attainment of a particular end. As such, the question
of how in fact they originated can be answered by
reference to the conscious intention of the designer.
In sharp contrast, Hayek contends that such institutions
as language and rules of conduct are not the results
of human design but rather that of a long process of
evolution. On this ground, Hayek accuses constructivists
of committing the anthropomorphic fallacy in that they
have misrepresented the results of evolution as that of
human design.
The second has to do with the epistemological
assumption of omniscience underlying the constructivist
position. The term synoptic delusion is occassionally
used by Hayek to describe this arrogant attitude towards
the power of human knowledge. This is the view that
all the relevant facts are known to some one mind, and
that-it is possible to construct from this knowledge of
the particulars a desirable order.(4) For Hayek, no
man. is endowed with such vision. It is because man is
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irremediably ignorant of the particular facts on which
the working of society rests. As I proceed, these two
contentions would be further expounded. To sum up,
according.'to Hayek, the anthropomorphic interpretation
of social institutions and the exaggeration
of the power
. •of human knowledge are the two errors that all con-
structivist rationalism has committed. And they are to
be rejected in favor of the evolutionary theory of the
growth of social institutions and the view of the
irremediable ignorance of man.
Granting that Hayek is right about all this, how
does the rejection of constructivist rationalism bear
on that of utilitarianism? Fairly obviously, if
utilitarianism, as Hayek claims, is just a particular form
of constructivist rationalism, then it must share the
latter's two erroneous positions as well. As such,
rejecting constructivist rationalism involves rejecting
utilitarianism. However, in my opinion, the premise on
which the argument is based (i.e, utilitarianism is just
a particular form of constructivist rationalism) is questionable.
For it assumes that all utilitarians are indeed con-
structivists. Against this, I shall argue that there is
no necessary or internal connection between them.
In order to have a clear picture of what is being
argued here, a general definition of utilitarianism is
required. In its most general form, utilitarianism is
the theory that the objects of moral appraisal, such as
actions, social institutions, moral codes or traits of
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character can be evaluated in terms of their impact on
general human welfare. If an action (institution code
etc.) has better consequences for human welfare than those
of its rivals, then it is morally acceptable otherwise,
it must be rejected. (5) Sticking to this definition,
I will examine the relation between utilitarianism and
the constructivist interpretation of rules of conduct.
According to my understanding, utilitarianism does
not entail the constructivist interpretation of rules
of conduct, since the latter may well be rejected in
favor of another interpretation, while it is maintained
that rules of conduct are justified by their consequences
for general welfare. My view here is this. Utilitarianism
only specifies that it is by reference to their
consequences for general welfare that rules of conduct
are to be justified. As such, it pays no special regard
to the problem of how these rules in fact originated.
Hence, I cannot see in what way utilitarianism
necessarily implied the constructivist interpretation
of rules of conduct. Rather, it seems more likely that
utilitarians can reject or accept any particular position
concerning the problem of the origin of these rules
as they see fit to their other theoretical commitments.
Christian Bay, I think, has offered us a very
convincing example in point. He writes:
Standards of morality and justice are what Hume
calls artifacts they are neither divinely ordained,
nor an integral part of original human nature, nor
revealed by pure reason. They are an outcome of
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of the practical experience of mankind, and the
sole consideration in the slow test of time is the
utility each moral rule can demonstrate towards
promoting human welfare. Hume may be called a
precursor to Darwin in the field of ethics. In
effect, he proclaimed a doctrine of the survival
of the fittest among human conventions- fittest
not in terms of good teeth but in terms of maximum
social utility. (6)
Here we can see Hume can legitimately be regarded as an
utilitarian in that he seeks to justify rules of conduct
in terms of their conduciveness to the promotion of
general social utility. However, with respect to the
problem of why they are in existence, Hume does not get
his answer from such explanatory accounts as divine
creation, biological endowment, or human design (i.e.,
constructivist rationalism). Rather, he has employed
the evolutionary theory of the growth of such rules.
Such being the case, contrary to Hayek's claim, it can
be reasoned that constructivist rationalism is not
characteristic of all utilitarianism.
Let us now turn to the question whether
utilitarianism necessarily entails the assumption of
omniscience. Hayek's answer to this is again positive.
In Law, Legislation and Liberty Vol.2, he asserts:
It has always amazed me how serious and intelligent
man, as the utilitarian undoubtedly were, could
have failed to take seriously this crucial fact of
our necessary ignorance of most of the particular
facts and could have proposed a theory which
presupposes a-knowledge of the particular effects
of our individual actions when in fact the whole
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phenomenon they set out to explain, namely of a
system of rules of conduct was due to the
impossibility of such knowledge. (7)
What Hayek.is saying here can be elaborated as follow.
It is often maintained that in order to decide which
action (or rule of conduct) has the greatest utility,
utilitarians need to have a full knowledge of all the
particular effects that different alternatives will
produce. For it is hardly conceivable how they can
tell which alternative is the most beneficial one
unless this knowledge of particular effects can be
known to them. As such, the claim that the assumption
of omniscience is a necessary component of utilitarianism
seems to be a very natural view to take.
But, in my opinion, while utilitarianism and the
assumption of omniscience are often associated, perhaps
in practice, they are distinct. One may reject the
latter, and still hold the former. I think Hayek's
view that they are internally connected can hold water,
if utilitarianism can only be viewed as a constructivist
doctrine. However, as I have shown earlier, it is not
the case that constructivist rationalism is characteristic
of all utilitarianism. If this point is correct, and
if one can, as (Bay's) Hume does, view utilitarianism
within an evolutionary perspective, then I think it does
not need to take the omniscience of man as its necessary
assumption. Let us see.
According to my understanding, the problem both
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constructivist rationalism and evolutionism attempt to
resolve is this: why do beneficial rules of conduct exist?
As mentioned above, constructivist rationalism holds that
they are invented in clear awareness of the desirable
effects that they produce. (8) To put it differrently.
they are the result of a deliberate choice of means for
foreknown ends. And this choice is guided by the
explicit calculation of the particular effects that
different alternatives will produce. Such being the case,
constructivist rationalism entails the calculative mode
of adaptation of means to end. And this mode, in turn,
entails that the designer is omniscient.
Unlike constructivist rationalism, evolutionism
holds that these rules are not the product of deliberate
invention but rather that of a process of natural selection
in which only the fit can pass muster and continue to
exist. That is, the development of the rules is a
trial and error process -a process in which alternative
rules compete and the more effective are selected by
the success of the groups following them. (9) Furthermore,
these rules, once selected! would become prevalent if
they are spontaneously imitated by many others. Here we
can see that the fitness of these rules is not established
by being rationally demonstrated that they are most
conducive to foreknown ends but rather by their actual
contribution to the success of the groups following them.
Hence, as long as they remain conducive to the success
of those groups, they will prersist or go on existing.
29
Now, since they are the product of a process of selection
guided not by explicit calculation but by success, we
can never know in advance which rules will pass muster.
As such, it seems that we can at best know this
restropectively.
Just.as a group may owe its rise to the morals
which its members obey, and their values in
consequence be ultimately imitated by the whole
nation which the successful group has come to
lead, so may a group or nation destroy itself by
the moral beliefs to which it adheres. Only the
eventual results can show whether the ideals
which guide a group are beneficial or destructive. (10)
Hence, the omniscience of man, it may be argued at this
point, is not a necessary component of evolutionism.
Viewed from the evolutionary perspective, man is not an
omniscient engineer but a problem-solver who has to
grapple forever with the unpredictable environmental
challenges.
,Thus far, I have tried to show two things: firstly,
utilitarianism is not logically or internally related to
constructivist rationalism. Secondly, utilitarianism
can be coherently viewed as an evolutionary doctrine
and therefore, needs not presuppose the omniscience of
man. Now, if these two points are correct, then I think
our attempt to characterize Hayek as an utilitarian is
not impossible. For Hayek can, then, reject
constructivist rationalism and the assumption of
omniscience, and still hold to utilitarianism. In my
opinion, in his argument for the liberal institutions,
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Hayek, like Hume, does in fact employ utilitarianism,
albeit of the evolutionary and not the
constructivist type,
In The Constitution of Liberty, Hayek tells us that
the evolutionary interpretation of the growth of social
institutions is the indispensable foundation of? the
the argument for liberty. (11) Again, in The Legal
and Political Philosophy of David Hume, he stresses that
the said interpretation is the basis of Hume's case-for
liberty. (12) At first sight,'what seems to be suggested
here is that rules of liberty should be adpoted simply*
because they are a product of evolution. If this is what
Hayek has in mind, then he is liable to the charge of
deriving ought from is. That is, he is criticized for
justifying rules of liberty which are normative
recommendations by his evolutionary theory of the growth
of such rules which is explanatory in character.
However, according to my understanding, a closer
reading of Hayek indicates how mistaken this criticism
is-. The mistake involved consists in misconceiving the
role this evolutionary account plays in his defence of
liberty. Instead of directly deducing liberal rules or
principles from the evolutionary explanation of their
emergence and persistence, Hayek, I shall argue, derives
them from this explanation with the principle of utility as
the major premise. To see this, one needs only to turn
to one of his passages-in The Legal and Political
Philosophy of David Hume.
31
The transition from explanation to ideal does not, however, involve
Hume (or, for that matter, Hayek) in any illegitimate confusion of
explanation and recommendation...What he undertakes is to show that
certain characteristics of modern society which we prize are
dependent on conditions which were not created in order to bring
about these results, yet are nevertheless their indispensable
presuppositions. They are institutions 'advantageous to the public
though ...not intended for that purpose by the inventors.' (13)
From this passage, we can see that Hayek and constructivists have two
things in common. Firstly, they both accept the normative premise that
rules of conduct which are conducive to general welfare should be
followed. Secondly, they agree with the factual observation that rules
of liberty are so conducive. However, they differ in one significant
respect, namely their answers to the problem of why rules of liberty exist.
As mentioned above, the institutions of freedom, for Hayek, were not
established because of the fact that people foresaw the benefits they
would bring. (14) Rather, they have evolved because the groups who
practised them were more successful. (15) As such, he seeks only to
refute constructivist rationalism on the explanatory level. And it is
on the same level that he introduces his evolutionary account. If my
interpretation here is correct, then it is wrongheaded to charge Hayek
with deriving ought from is. It is because the evolutionary account
only serves as a supporting explanatory premise. And it is the principle
of utility that Hayek appeals to in his argument for liberty. Hence,
Hayek is deriving ought from ought.*
% my argument here can be further clarified by the following diagram:-
All rules of conduct which are conducive(normative premise)
to the general welfare should be followed.




(normative con- Rules of liberty should be followed.
clusion)
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So far I have concentrated my analysis largely on
the formal aspect of Hayek's utilitarianism. This is
that he seeks to justify liberty in terms of its beneficial
consequences. In other words, his account for liberty
is consequentialistic in form. However, for our argument
that he is an utilitarian to be complete, it is not
enough just to show that he is a consequentialist. It
is simply because while all utilitarians are consequential-
ists, not all consequentialists are utilitarians. What
still needs to be made clear here is his criterion of
general welfare, that is, the content of his conception
of general welfare. It is to the delineation of this
conception that I now turn.
To begin with, Hayek is critical of the aggregative
notion of general welfare propounded by classical
utilitarians. According to them, general welfare is
interpreted as the sum of all the private interests.
(16) Against this, Hayek contends that individual
utilities cannot be summed up and interpersonally compared,
for they embody personal valuation which is not amenable
to objective measurement.
As opposed to this interpretation, Hayek holds that
the conception of general welfare of a free society can
only be defined as an abstract order which as a whole
is not oriented on any particular concrete ends but provides
merely-the best chance for any member selected at random
successfully to use his knowledge for his purposes. (17)
In general, I agree with his attacks on the aqqreqative
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notion. However, I do not think he has articulated
clearly enough the meaning of his own conception. In what
follows I shall attempt to clarify this by offering my
own interpretation.
According to my understanding, Hayek's general
welfare has reference primarily to the preservation of
the order. By order he means a state of affairs in
which a multiplicity of elements of various kinds are
so related.to each other that we may learn from our
acquaintance with some spatial or temporal part of the
whole to form correct expectations concerning the rest,
or at least expectations which have a good chance of
proving correct. (18) As such, Hayek's concept consists
in the condition of affairs whereby individuals can form
and adjust their plans of action, that is in economic terms,
make more efficient use of their resources. This order,
thus, enhance everyone's chance of benefit, though not
guaranteeing particular results for particular individuals.
Let me explain'this a little bit further. The order,
for him, does not have any specified content. Its content
is determined by the free actions or decisions of many
individuals. In other words, its content is the
unintended consequence of multiple individual decisions.
As such, no one is capable of foretelling what his decision,
when combined with those of others, will produce. So,
there is always a possibility that some expectation will
be disappointed by such unintended results. This systematic
disappointment requires adjustment of individual plans
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of action. This means that individuals have to reformulate
their expectations so that their effort can be put to
more beneficial pursuits. From here we can see that
the order does not aim at securing particular results
but rather at providing a mechanism whereby co-ordination
can be achieved spontaneously among individuals. Hence,
it is not unjustifiable to say that it is a multi-
purpose means which enhancefonly their chance of benefits.
Hayek's general welfare, it can be claimed, consists
principally in the facilitation of the pursuit of a
great variety of unknown individual pruposes.
In this chapter, I have repeatedly emphasized that
Hayek's defence of liberty is utilitarian in character.
However, it is important to keep in mind that his
utilitarianism is not tied with the constructivist
tradition. Rather, he locates it in the evolutionary
tradition which maintains the natural selection of
rules of conduct. If this is correct, then an important
question arises. Does Hayek's emphasis on the
evolutionary growth of social institutions necessitate
the elimination of the role of reason or human effort in
bringing about reform? This, then, will be the main
concern of the next chanter_
35
Notes
1. F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. I,
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, p. 55.
2. F.A. Hayek, Law,Legislation and Liberty, Vol. II,
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, p. 22.
3. F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. I,
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, p.-5.
4. Ibid. p. 14.
5. H.S. Goldman, Rawls and Utilitarianism, in
H.G. Block and E.H. Smith, eds. John Rawls'
Theory of Social Justice, Athen: Ohio University
Press, 1980, p. 346.
6. F.A. Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and
Economics, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1967, p. 111.
7. F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. II,
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, p. 20.
8. F.A. Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and
Economics, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1967, p. 85.
9. F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. II,
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, p. 57.
10. F.A. Hayek, Constitution of Liberty, Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1960, p. 67.
1.1. Ibid. p. 57.
12. F.A. Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and
Economics, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1967, p. 111.
13. Ibid. p. 112.
14. F.A. Hayek, Constitution of Liberty, Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1960, p. 54.
15. Ibid. p. 57.
16. F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. II,
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, p. 2.
17. F.A. Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and
Economics, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1967, p. 163.
18. F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. I,
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, p.. 36.
Chapter III
Reason and Evolution
In the last chapter, I pointed out that rules of con-
duct, for Hayek, are the result of a process of natural
selection. This implies that we human beings cannot
control which rules will turn out prevailing over others,
since the selection of rules is guided by how success-
fully they are in fostering the flourishment of the
groups following them and the extent to which such be-
havioral patterns are spontaneously imitated. If this
is so, it seems that human effort or reason does not
have any role to play in Hayek's theory of social and
political change. And it also seems to follow that all
that man can do is to entrust his fate to the blind for-
ces of evolution which he cannot master and comprehend
in entirety.
According to my understanding, the validity of the
claim that Hayek has dethroned the role of reason in
social and political change depends heavily on what is
meant* by the term reason here. Undeniably, Hayek is
outright critical of the constructivists' views on rea-
son. There are basically two objections that he makes
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to them. Firstly, Hayek argues that owing to the
irremediable ignorance of man, it is unthinkable to
expect him to regulate his behavior in accordance with
their criterion of rational action. For constructivists,
to act rationally is to choose, as a result of full
calculation, that course of action which has the best
consequences. As such, it entails that the actor can
possess a full knowledge of the consequences of all
possible alternatives of action. Or in Hayek's words,
it entails that the actor is omniscient. It is with
respect to this that he charges this conception of
rational action with the exaggeration of the power of
human knowledge. For it simply ignores the fact that
human foresight is just too limited to meet with its
stringent expectation. In his connection, Hayek asserts:
The crucial fact of our lives is that we are not
omniscient, that we have from moment to moment to
adjust ourselves to new facts which we have not
known before, and that we can therefore not order
our lives according to a preconceived detailed plan
in which every particular action is rationally
adjusted to every other. (1)
Hayek's second objection is that it is untenable
to hold that man can criticize existing tradition from
an Archemedian point-- a standpoint which is outside
or above history. This objection stems from his empha-
sis o'n the historical situatedness of human existence.
We human beings, Hayek maintains, are histroically sit-
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uated. We could not choose the starting point. That is,
we did not contrive our traditions at some point in time
and then voluntarily entered into them. Rather, we
find ourselves in them. They are, so to speak,pre-
existing and provide the background presuppositions
which govern our undertanding of social life and handling
of moral matters and so on. As such, it seems that
without these traditions tacitly presupposed, social
activities of all sorts will break down. This, I think,
is why Hayek tells us that our traditions are not a
product but a presupposition of reason. (2) In other
words, it is as a matter of human predicament that we
cannot reason without tradition. Now, if this is cor-
rect, then it follows that we can never conduct social
and political criticism from the said standpoint. For
any such criticism implies that we can somehow disencum-
ber ourselves of given traditions. And this, in turn,
.implies that such traditions are something tha-c z. be
freely put aside without rendering human activities im-
possible. In this light, the advocates for this ahis-
torical standpoint, Hayek contends, fail to take the
role of human tradition and therefore human finitude
seriously.
From the above analysis it is not difficult to see
that if reason is understood as those views upheld by
constructivists, then Hayek can rightly be regarded as
an anti-rationalist. For Hayek strongly opposes any
conception of reason which fails to take man as what he is,
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(that is, he is incurably ignorant and historically
situated) and therefore naively demands man to do some-
thing that he simply cannot do.
However, in my opinion, although Hayek takes pains
to dispel the constructivists' views on reason,'this
does not entail that he repudiates reason per se. It
is because not all conceptions of reason are constructi-
vistic in kind. In fact, far from abandoning human rea-
son completely, Hayek sets bounds to it. He pleads that
an effective use of reason required a proper insight
into the limits of the effective use of individual rea-
son, an insight which constructivist rationalism lacks.
(3) As mentioned above, these bounds lie in certain
facts of human situation: the historical situatedness
of human existence, the incurable ignorance of man and
the evolutionary growth of the content of traditions.
In the light of these considerations, Hayek argues that
if man is doomed to be confined by these limits, the
standpoint of which we can avail ourselves to evaluate
existing traditions is only that of immanent criticism.
It is to the analysis of this point that I now turn.
In order to see how these three facts lead to the
adoption of the immanent criticism, we must first con-
sider their interrelationships. In my view, they are
not seperate themes arbitrarily put together by Hayek.
Rather, they reinforce and shed light on one another in
Hayek's argument for immanent criticism. To begin with,
let us proceed to examine how the evolutionary thesis
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and the ignorance thesis join together to dismantle any
attempt to justify moral standards conclusively. Suc-
cessfully explaining this point, as I shall show later,
would help clarify why Hayek argues that man must be con-
tent with immanent criticism.
In order to have a clear picture of what is being
discussed here, I shall first briefly outline Hayek's
theory of social evolution. Throughout his works Hayek
is careful to point out that his theory of social evolu-
tion is different from the historicist's. According to
the latter, social change is governed by some inevitable
law- a law of the necessary sequences of predetermined
stages or phases through which ...a social institu-
tion must pass. (4) Furthermore, they assert that by
discovering this law, man is capable of foretelling the
future course of social development. Against this, Ha-
yek contends that the content of social development is
indeterminate since it is contingent upon changing cir-
cumstances which are unpredictable on our part. In
other words, the fitness of, say, the content of exist-
ing traditions is only provisional. Their continued
existence depends on whether they can adapt adequately
to changing circumstances. And owing to the fact that
our foresight is extremely limited, we can never master
all the possibilities that lie ahead of our present
horizon. It follows that we can never be certain what
are fit to exist now will remain so in any future time.
Hence, as opposed to the historicists, Hayek is taking
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an indeterminist position in social evolution.
Now adopting Hayek's evolutionary position entails
the rejection of absolutism which holds that there are
indubitable moral standards which cannot be affected by
contingent historical conditions. The reason for this
is that according to the former, the fitness of existing
moral standards is contingent upon changing circumstances.
In other words, their status, far from being absolute,
is only conditional or so far so good. As such, it seems
that unless one is in the position of the last histor-
ian- a person at the end of history who would possess
the overarching conception that could then illuminate
the truth of all preceding events- he could never con-
elusively justify any moral standards. (5) But since man
is unable to foretell the future course of social de-
velopment, he cannot anticipate the point of view of the
last. historian. It follows from this that any. attempt
to ground moral standards conclusively is bound to be
in vain.
If the above analysis is correct, then an important
question arises. How can we go about to criticize or
evaluate existing social and political arrangements, if
we fall short of a certain basis or foundation? On the
one hand, owing to our permanent ignorance, we cannot
possess the point of view of the last historian and are
therefore unable to ground moral standards conclusively.
But on the other hand, it is generally maintained that
criticism can only be made by reference to some basis
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or standard. Here Hayek is facing a dilemma. He has
to seek for a basis which is not absolute in nature,
but which at the same time is not arbitrary in charac-
ter.
According to my understanding, Hayek attempts to
resolve this difficulty by proposing an alternative con-
ception of criticism, namely immanent criticism. By
this he means that the basis of criticism of anyone
product of tradition must alway.s be other products, of
tradition which for the purpose at hand must be accepted
as not requiring justification in other words, that
particular aspects of a culture can only be critically
examined only within the context of that culture.(6)
Hayek's intention here is clear. By proffering this
conception of criticism, he wants to indicate that we do
not need a certain basis or an Archemedian point, so to
speak, to make criticism. Rather, we can very well judge
particular values of our culture by reference to some
other values of the same-culture. This consists in jud-
ging the former in terms of their consistency with the
latter. If they fail to meet this test of consistency,
they, argues Hayek, should be rejected accordingly. So in
this light, it seems unnecessary to evaluate their vali-
dity by referenece to a certain basis.
However, the problem at issue cannot be regarded
as settled at this point. For if particular aspects of
a culture are to be judged by the standard proposed
by Hayek (i.e. the other aspects of the same culture),
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we may still ask what are the reasons for using exactly
this standard. In my opinion, Hayek cannot bypass this
question without giving us the impression that his use
of the standard is just arbitrary. Here we see that
the said dilemma re-emerges.
If I.am not mistaken, the idea of the last historian
may admit a different interpretation that can help
one get rid of this dilemma. To recapitulate, the last
historian has been characterized above as someone at
the end of history who could be certain that new events
or circumstances would not take place. As such, he is
in an epistemologically privileged position that enables
him to ground moral standards conclusively. But armed
with the ignorance thesis, Hayek contends that no one
is capable of attaining this point of view. For this
reason, he concludes that it is fruitless to search for
an absolute foundation or basis.
Although Hayek insists that the point of view of
the last historian is inaccessible to us, he contends
that .criticism cannot be made if we do not presume that
we are the last historian. That is, we must presume
that certain aspects of our tradition are final or
something that require no further grounding. The reason
for this is that we cannot simultaneously make criticism
and question the validity of the standard that our
criticism refers to. We cannot question everything all
at once. We can always examine one part of the whole
only in terms of that whole which we cannot entirely
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reconstruct and the greater part of which we must accept
unexamined. (7) Such being the case, it can be argued
that the said presumption is a must for making criticism.
In other words, it provides the condition of the
possibility of the activity of human judgement. After
all, it is inconceivable that we can make criticism
while at the same time anticipating that its standard
may be evolved away in the future. So, this presumption
is something that we have to choose here and now, if we
are to judge at all. Commenting,on this point, Hayek
writes:
The only standard by which we can judge particular
values of our society is the entire body of other
values of the same society. More precisely, the
factually existing, but always imperfect, the
actions produced by obedience to these values
provides the touchstone for evaluation. Because
prevailing systems of morals or values do not always
give unambiguous answers to the questions which
arise, but often prove to be internally contradictory,
systems continuously. We shall sometimes be
constrained to sacrifice some moral value, but
always only to other moral values which we regarded
as superior. We cannot escape this choice, because
it is part of an indispensable process. (8)
Granting that criticism cannot be carried out without
presupposing certain traditions, different societies may,
however, have different content of what is to be counted
as the accepted basis of their respective tradition. Now
since immanent criticism as defined above implies that
criticism is contextual in character, it follows that
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the accepted basis of one society cannot be used as the
yardstick for judging the events of another. For to
maintain otherwise would be to suggest that there is an
universal rid external criterion on which the preference
of one contextual standard to another can be based. Here
we see that immanent criticism is necessarily opposed to
such criterion. It is at this point that the charge of
relativism is leveled against Hayek by some critics.
They point out that his endorsement of immanent criticism
commits him to some form of relativism. For the former
entails that if there are two or more contextual standards,
there is no independent way of deciding which onfe of them
is better than another.
In response to this charge, one may argue on behalf
of Hayek that he is not a relativist in that he does
propose an objective criterion for the appraisal of
competing traditional contexts. To see this we have to
return to his evolutionary utilitarianism.
Although Hayek holds that criticism cannot be
carried out without presupposing certain traditions, he
does not for this reason regard the content of these
particular traditions as constant. Rather, it is contingent
and subject to further evolutionary change. As I have
mentioned in the last chapter, it is Hayek's contention
that certain traditions will continue to exist or remain
prevalent to the extent that they help the groups following
them to flourish (or succeed) by facilitating the
formation of an efficient spontaneous social order. Such
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being the case, these traditions are not by definition
fit for the promotion of general welfare. Rather, their
fitness is tested by whether they continue to prove
themselves in competing with other rules observed by
other individuals or groups. (9) So from the perspective
of Hayek's evolutionary utilitarianism, we see that
competing traditions can be further tested in terms of
their fitness, and that general welfare is the criterion
for fitness. In the Constitution of Liberty, Hayek
explicitly claims:
It is, of course, a mistake to believe that we can
draw conclusion about what our values ought to be
simply because we realize that they are the product
of evolution. But we cannot reasonably doubt that
these values are created and altered by the same
evolutionary forces that have produced our intelli-
gence. All that we can know is that the ultimate
deci.-sion about: what is good or bad will be made not
by individual wisdom but by the decline of the
groups that have adhered to the wrong beliefs. (10)
It is with respect to this that Hayek can be defended
from the charge of relativism.
Yet, in my view, this defence is fraught with
difficulties. Firstly, for this defence to succeed in
getting rid of the charge of relativism, it is necessary
to show that the criterion appealed to is universally
accepted. As mentioned above, his conception of general
welfare consists in maximizing the chances of any unknown
individual's realizing his ends at minimum cost to
himself and others. (11) Is it the case that this
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criterion is cross-culturally accepted? Certainly, it
is not. For some societies, general welfare involves at
its core the pursuit of communal solidarity rather than
the maximization of the chance of individual advancement.
Now, if Hayek's conception is not one and only, then why,
it may be pressed further, should we take it but not
others as the terminal point in moral justification?
Needless to say, Hayek's answer cannot be that it is on
the basis of his criterion that this preference is to be
made. For, undoubtedly, this would be question-begging.
But if he fails to produce any answer here, then I think
the problem of relativism will remain unresolved. Of
course, the problem has now shifted from the level of
contextual standards to that of alleged ultimate criteria.
Secondly, aimed at getting rid of the charge of
relativism, this defence interprets Hayek's conception of
general welfare as some fundamental fixed point in moral
justification. As such, I cannot see in what way this
-position differs from absolutism that he refutes. (12.)
Thirdly, even granting the status of his criterion
is unproblematic, evolutionary utilitarianism, as it stands,
is unable to resolve conflicts between existing traditions.
To reiterate, evolutionary utilitarianism holds that
certain traditions will continue to exist or remain
prevalent to the extent that they contribute to the
promotion of general welfare. The implication here is
that no tradition will continue to survive unless it
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performs some useful function. (13) From this it follows
that so long as two or more rival traditions are
co-existing, they should accordingly be considered as
having utility value. If this is so, I wonder.how
conflicts between existing traditions can be resolved
by reference to Hayek's criterion.
Finally, the value of evolutionary utilitarianism
for the appraisal of existing rival traditions is further
diminished by Hayek's ignorance thesis. For if man
could never know in advance of experience the future
course of social evolution, then he is unable to determine
here and now which tradition is going to prevail or
decline. To wit, if all of us are equally ignorant, who
could be certain whether history is on one's side.
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The last historian, originally formulated by
A.C. Danto, is characterized here as someone
at the end of history who-could be certain that
new events or circumstances would not take
place. As such, he is in an epistemologically
privileged position that enables him to ground
moral standards conclusively.
6. F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. II,
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, p. 25.
7. Ibid. p. 25.
8. F.A. Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics
and Economics, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1978, p. 19-20.
9. F.A...Hayek, The Constitution of Libert, Chicago:
The university a Chicago Press, 1960, p. 36.
l0. Ibid. p. 36.
11. John Gray, Hayek on Liberty and Tradition, The
Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 4, 1980,
p. 1 7.
12. If Hayek's conception of general welfare is taken
to be some fundamental fixed point in moral
justification, then his position will fall into
absolutism which holds that there are indubitable
moral standards which cannot be affected by contingent
historical conditions. For this point, see p. 41.
13. F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1960, p.433, n.2.
CONCLUSION
In the last chapter, I have pointed out that
immanent criticism, for Hayek, means that all criticism
must be contextual in character. This implies that
the accepted standard of one society cannot be used as
the yardstick for judging the events of another. If
this is so, then it seems that he is barred from.:
launching criticisms upon the political practices of,
say, the present Iranian regime in the name of liberalism.
For such a liberal critique would amount to an external
rather then immanent criticism. That is, the Iranian
poltical practices are not evaluated in terms of her own
contextual standard but rather of the liberal standard
imposed from outside. Moreover, an external criticism
presupposes that there is an universal criterion on
which the preference of one contextual standard to
another can be based. Needless to say, immanent criticism
as defined above is necessarily opposed to such criterion.
vow, the bearing this has on the scope or applicability
Df l-iberal political reform is clear. If we endorse
Hayek's immanent criticism, we are committed to accepting
the view that liberal political reform should only be
launched in a society where liberal values already prevail.
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As such, perhaps, David Miller is correct when he claims
that Hayek offers his readers a foundationless liberalism,
suited only to the needs of established liberal orders
threatened by collectivist movements, but offering
nothing to preliberal (or, for that matter, postliberal)
societies„ (1)
Its weaknesses aside, Hayek's liberalism, if read
sympathetically, does have some very illuminating things
to say. One should always realize that most of his
writings are aimed at defending the liberal status quo
from the attacks of those who want to restructure it in
accordance with some utopian design. To this end, he
argues first and foremost that owing to our irremediable
ignorance, we are not capable of mastering all the
particular facts necessary to social reconstruction on
a vast scale. Such being the case, any attempt to restructure
society in accordance with some detailed plan is bound
to be in vain.
Furthermore, he contends that the reason why the
liberal institutions continue to exist is that they
have so far been successful in fostering general welfare.
Of course, no one could be absolutely certain they will
last forever. All that one can say is that they are so
far so good. However, it is a commonplace that not
everyone living in a liberal society is contented with
the status quo. Some social do-gooders may even claim
that they should be replaced by some better arrangements.
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In response, Hayek, like Popper, would assume a skeptical
posture and ask for the reason why the blue--printed world
should be any better than the world in which we live. (2)
Needless-to say, the burden of proof lies always with
those who advance the claim in the first place!
For Hayek, as the products of social evolution,
the liberal institutions and their supporting traditional
practices embody the experience of many more trials and
errors than any individual mind could aquire. If we
abandon them simply on grounds of short-sighted
advantages-advantages that are within the reach of our
individual calculation, then we would destroy many
inherited practices that are beneficial for us.
This is why Hayek tells us that freedom can be preserved
only by following principles and is destroyed by following
expediency. (3) And one may add that only by following
principles can general utility be secured.
In a nutshell, Hayek's message for us can be stated
as follows. Although liberal institutions are not in any
sense perfect, they are the best we have ever attained
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